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INTRODUCTION 
In 1973, Sotheby Park Bernet (now Sotheby’s) auctioned off 
fifty works from famed New York City taxi magnate Robert 
Scull’s art collection.1  The auction realized well over two million 
dollars in sales—the highest price of $240,000 going to Jasper 
Johns’ Double White Map.2  But the most notable sale might have 
been Robert Rauschenberg’s Thaw, which Scull purchased from 
well-known art dealer Leo Castelli for $900 many years prior.3  
Thaw sold for $85,000—a 9400% gain.4  The sale upset the artist, 
who happened to be present during the auction, and prompted him 
to confront Scull and yell, “I’ve been working my ass off for you 
 
 1 See Baruch D. Kirschenbaum, The Scull Auction and the Scull Film, 39 ART J. 50, 
50 (1979). 
 2 See id. 
 3 See John Henry Merryman, The Wrath of Robert Rauschenberg, 41 AM. J. COMP. L. 
103, 110 (1993). 
 4 See id. 
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to make all that profit.”5  From that point on, Rauschenberg 
became a strong proponent of droit de suite,6 or artist’s resale 
royalty rights—a right giving the artist a share in the proceeds 
when his or her artwork is resold on the secondary market—and he 
would see some success when in 1976 droit de suite legislation 
eventually passed in California.7 
More recently, droit de suite has garnered increased attention.  
Late in 2011, several lawsuits were filed in California based on 
various auction houses’ failure to pay artists in accordance with the 
state’s droit de suite statute.8  In December 2011, both houses of 
the U.S. Congress introduced legislation9 that would implement a 
federal droit de suite similar to those found in Europe.10  Finally, 
on January 1, 2012, Great Britain fully implemented its 2006 droit 
de suite statute for the estates of deceased artists in order to comply 
with a 2001 European Union directive requiring all member states 
to implement such laws.11 
Although proponents have recently been attempting to 
strengthen the right of droit de suite globally, all laws based on the 
right are flawed—so much so that further implementation would 
have almost none of the positive effects that its sponsors hope for.  
This is to say that droit de suite, which is meant to protect young 
artists,12 actually discourages the creation of art by young artists, 
 
 5 See id.  Some sources say Rauschenberg actually physically assaulted Scull. See 
Kirschenbaum, supra note 1, at 51. 
 6 See Merryman, supra note 3, at 110.  
 7 See Cal. Civ. Code § 986 (West 2012), invalidated by Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s 
Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 
 8 See, e.g., Estate of Graham, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 1117; Sam Francis Foundation v. 
eBay Inc., 2:11-cv-08622-JHN-PLA (C.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2011).  
 9 S. 2000, 122th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011); H.R. 3688, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011). 
 10 See infra notes 38–40 and accompanying text. 
 11 See Henry Lydiate, Artists Resale Right: 4th Year Report, ARTQUEST (2010), 
http://www.artquest.org.uk/articles/view/artists-resale-right-4th-year-report# (stating that 
2010 was the fourth anniversary of the UK’s droite de suite law, the Artist’s Resale 
Right). 
 12 Throughout this article, I use the term “young artists” to refer to visual artists who 
have not yet gained wide acceptance of their work throughout the art world.  That is, 
“young artists” may or may not be younger than their peers, but there is likely no market 
for their work on the resale market where droit de suite income is derived.  This term 
would include artists such as Jean Francois-Millet, discussed infra in Part I.A, whose 
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and reduces the amount of money an artist can make from a sale.  
Furthermore, droit de suite conflicts with basic common law 
notions of copyright and property and is incompatible with 
standard theories of intellectual property law. 
This paper discusses how droit de suite works in practice, 
providing a detailed analysis of its failures and an explanation of 
why attempts to further promulgate the right in common law 
nations should be quashed.  Part I provides a history of droit de 
suite followed by a general overview of the contemporary art 
market and an explanation of the droit de suite directive in effect in 
Europe.  Part II analyzes the EU droit de suite directive and 
discusses its justifications, how it works in practice, and who 
benefits, with an emphasis on the fact that it fails to achieve its 
goals.  Part III explains why droit de suite should not be further 
promulgated throughout the world.  This Part also addresses a 
number of policy concerns that should discourage further droit de 
suite implementation, and then discusses the three major theories 
of copyright and the incompatibility between droit de suite and 
each theory, in an attempt to bolster opposition to further 
implementation of droit de suite. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF DROIT DE SUITE AND ART MARKETS 
A.  History of Droit de Suite 
Droit de suite literally means “follow-up right,” but is more 
generally understood as an artist’s resale royalty right, which 
provides the artist with a certain percentage of the sale price when 
his work is resold on the secondary art market.13  The right is 
considered by many to be a moral right because it is inalienable 
and unwaiveable, and because it is often justified through the 
personhood theory of copyright, which suggests that the creator of 
a work never really gives up all of the property interests in the 
 
work had not yet caught on but would eventually, as well as artists whose work is sold 
from time to time but will never gain wide appreciation and success. 
 13 See infra notes 53–59 and accompanying text. 
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work, as it is actually a part of the creator’s personhood.14  At the 
same time, however, some argue droit de suite is more like an 
economic right because it simply provides a pecuniary benefit to 
the artist.15  Whichever it is, droit moraux or droit patrimoniaux, 
the artist’s resale royalty right developed out of the France’s 
original version of copyright, or droit d’auteur, which was born 
during the French Revolution.16 
1. Moving Out of Patronage 
From before the Renaissance until roughly the seventeenth 
century, artists worked solely as patrons of the Church or the State 
and they were compensated as laborers.17  But by the eighteenth 
century, artists were recognized as intellectual workers who 
“needed legal protection in order to dedicate themselves to their 
work for ‘the best interest of the public.’”18  This idea led to the 
development of droit d’auteur, which granted playwrights, writers, 
and artists the exclusive rights of performance and reproduction for 
the duration of their lives plus a number of years beyond the 
author’s death.19  However, French courts began to recognize the 
additional rights of disclosure, attribution, integrity, and retraction 
based primarily on the idea that authors’ creations are a part of 
their personhood and augmented these laws.20 
 
 14 See Diane B. Schulder, Art Proceeds Act: A Study of the Droit de Suite and a 
Proposed Enactment for the United States, 61 NW. U. L. REV. 19, 21–22 (1966). 
 15 See id. at 22. 
 16 See LILIANE DE PIERREDON-FAWCETT, THE DROIT DE SUITE IN LITERARY AND 
ARTISTIC PROPERTY: A COMPARATIVE LAW STUDY 1 (Louise-Martin-Valiqueet trans., 
1991); see also Michael B. Reddy, The Droit de Suite: Why American Artists Should 
Have the Right to a Resale Royalty, 15 LOY L.A. ENT. L.  REV. 509, 513 (1995). 
 17 PIERREDON-FAWCETT, supra note 16, at 1. 
 18 Id. 
 19 See id. at 1 n.1 (“The Law of January 19, 1971 grants to playwrights, for their entire 
life, and to their heirs, for a period of five years after their death, the exclusive right to 
have their works performed.  The Law of July 19, 1973 grants to writers and artists an 
exclusive right to have their works reproduced.  The same right is given to their heirs for 
a period of ten years after their death.”). 
 20 See Cheryl Swack, Safeguarding Artistic Creation and the Cultural Heritage: A 
Comparison of Droit Moral Between France and the United States, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. 
& ARTS 361, 372–80 (1998). 
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2. Additional Protection for Visual Artists 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, scholars began to 
recognize that visual artists did not benefit from the droit d’auteur 
to the same degree as other authors such as writers and 
composers.21  This assumption laid the foundation for the droit de 
suite discussion.  Gone were the days when artists could rely on 
patronage from the Church and State for their livelihoods.  Artists 
necessarily had to earn a living by selling their artwork to 
collectors; but “greedy” dealers often took them advantage of 
them.22  Proponents of the droit de suite would cite lamentable 
cases of artists living in ruin while dealers made extraordinary 
profits on certain sales.  One famous example is that of Jean-
Francois Millet’s Angelus.  While Millet’s heirs lived on the streets 
selling flowers to survive,23 an art dealer, who had purchased 
Angelus for 70,000 francs some years prior, sold the painting for 
one million francs—and Millet’s family saw none of the profits.24  
The French Parliament took pity on the Millets, Cezannes, and 
Gauguins of the world—artists who “died in misery at a time when 
their paintings were bringing enormous sums” for dealers—and 
passed droit de suite into law in 1920.25 
Droit de suite supposedly “remed[ied] the unfair plight of the 
artist, forced to earn a living by his work and powerless vis-à-vis a 
greedy dealer.  It responded to the need to readjust the balance of 
economic forces involved.”26  It would spread to Belgium one year 
later, and then to Czechoslovakia, Poland, Uruguay, and Italy.27  
Realistically, however, it was only enforced in France and 
Belgium.28  In 1948, the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
 
 21 See PIERREDON-FAWCETT, supra note 16, at 1–2. 
 22 See id. at 2. 
 23 See Rita E. Hauser, The French Droit de Suite: The Problem of Protection for the 
Underprivileged Artist Under Copyright Law, 11 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 1, 1 (1962). 
 24 See PIERREDON-FAWCETT, supra note 16, at 2.  
 25 Hauser, supra note 23, at 2–3. 
 26 PIERREDON-FAWCETT, supra note 16, at 4. 
 27 See id. at 4–5 (explaining that Belgium followed suit by adopting its own version of 
droit de suite on June 25, 1921, followed by Czechoslovakia in 1926, Poland in 1935, 
Uruguay in 1937, and Italy in 1941). 
 28 See id. at 5 (stating that although droit de suite was recognized in a few “scattered 
statutes” across a small group of countries, it was “in effect applied only in France and 
Belgium”). 
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Literary and Artistic Works was amended to allow for a droit de 
suite, but stopped short of making it compulsory.29  The 
amendment did not create sufficient incentive to convince a single 
nation to adopt the right.30  But in 1965, Germany implemented its 
own droit de suite statute31 and many European civil law nations 
followed suit throughout the 1970s.32 
3. Modern Droit de Suite 
In 1976, California became the first U.S. state to create an 
artist’s resale royalty right,33 but no other U.S. state has recognized 
the right.  After the United States took steps to become a signatory 
to the Berne Convention, Congress considered implementing droit 
de suite among other moral rights for artists.34  Although a droit de 
suite was considered in early drafts of the Visual Artists’ Rights 
 
 29 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 14ter, 
Sept. 9, 1886, as amended Sept. 28, 1979, S. TREATY DOC. No. 99-27 (1986) [hereinafter 
Berne Convention] (“The [droit de suite] may be claimed in a country of the Union only 
if legislation in the country to which the author belongs so permits, and to the extent 
permitted by the country where this protection is claimed.”). 
 30 See PIERREDON-FAWCETT, supra note 16, at 5. 
 31 See id. at 229 (Art. 26 of Germany’s Act Dealing with Copyright and Related Rights 
of September 9, 1965 states “should the original of an artistic work be resold or should 
such resale involve an art dealer or auctioneer as purchaser, vendor or agent, the vendor 
shall pay the author a participation at the rate of one per centum of the sale price.  There 
shall be no obligation if the sale price is less than five hundred German marks.”). 
 32 See id. at 6 (explaining that “since 1965, the droit de suite has found a second wind: 
an increasing number of countries, now totaling 28, have incorporated it into their 
statutes”). 
 33 See Cal. Civ. Code § 986 (West 2012), invalidated by Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s 
Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2012).  California’s droit de suite statute provides 
for a five percent royalty on all sales of $1000 or more subsequent to the original sale 
with no maximum royalty. See id.  The statute has proven difficult to enforce, however, 
as is evidenced by the recent lawsuits filed in California. See cases cited supra note 8 and 
accompanying text.  In Morseburg v. Baylon, 621 F.2d 972, 978 (1980), California’s 
droit de suite statute was found to be not preempted by the copyright act of 1909, but no 
challenges had been brought against the law as to its validity under the Copyright Act of 
1976 until 2012 when a California district court found the law in violation of the dormant 
commerce clause at least as it is applied to artwork out of state. See Estate of Graham v. 
Sotheby’s Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d. 1117, 1126 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 
 34 See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1987: Hearing on H.R. 3221 Before the Subcomm. 
on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
100th Cong. 81–82 (1988) (statement of R. Frederick Woolworth, President, Art Dealers 
Association of America). 
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Act of 1990, the final bill passed without a resale royalty right,35 
merely prompting the U.S. Copyright Office to perform a study on 
the feasibility of implementing such a right for U.S. artists.36  The 
Copyright Office concluded that droit de suite should not be 
implemented in the United States, but that it would reconsider such 
a conclusion if Europe implemented the right more broadly.37 
In 2001, the European Union passed a directive requiring all 
member states to partially implement a droit de suite by 2006, with 
full implementation required by 2012.38  As the global trend seems 
to be moving in the direction of maintaining a droit de suite, 
Congress has once again proposed bringing it to the United States.  
In late 2011, bills were introduced in both the Senate and the 
House that would require a seven percent royalty on auctions of 
visual art exceeding $10,000.39  Half of the royalty would go to the 
artist or her heirs, while the other half would be deposited into an 
account established “for the purposes of funding purchases by 
nonprofit art museums in the United States of works of visual art 
authored by living artists domiciled in the United States.”40 
B. The Global Contemporary Art Market 
1. Impressionism to Contemporary Art 
The contemporary art market has changed significantly since 
the days of the “greedy” dealers who supposedly took advantage of 
French Impressionists.41  Prior to the 1950s, Paris was still the 
 
 35 See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994). 
 36 See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 608(b), 80 Stat. 
5089 (1990). 
 37 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF. REG. OF COPYRIGHTS, DROIT DE SUITE: THE ARTIST’S 
RESALE ROYALTY 149 (1992) (explaining that “the Copyright Office is not persuaded that 
sufficient economic and copyright policy justification exists to establish droit de suite in 
the United States. . . . Should the European Community harmonize existing droit de suite 
laws, Congress may want to take another look at the resale royalty, particularly if the 
Community decides to extend the royalty to all its member States”). 
 38 See Council Directive 2001/84, 2001 O.J. (L 272) 32 (EC). 
 39 See S. 2000, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011); H.R. 3688, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011). 
 40 See S. 2000, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011). 
 41 See supra notes 21–25 and accompanying text. 
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center of the contemporary art world.42  At the beginning of the 
twentieth century, when droit de suite first became law in France, 
Impressionist painters were not allowed in the salons—the official 
art exhibitions of the Société des Artistes Français in Paris.43  The 
emerging bourgeoisie (young and newly rich businessmen) had a 
desire to buy art, but likewise were prohibited from participating in 
the art establishment, which was controlled by old money.44  Some 
art dealers took advantage of this situation by purchasing art from 
poor artists who were willing to sell their paintings for bargain 
prices directly to the dealers, who would occasionally turn 
extraordinary profits.45  But the art dealers did not simply buy the 
art and sell it—they also had to convince the bourgeoisie that it 
was a worthy investment.  Dealers and critics were able to leverage 
social, political, and economic structures to develop a completely 
new market for art that artists likely would not have been able to 
create for themselves.  Somewhat ironically, without the very 
dealers who supposedly used artists’ unfavorable positions for their 
own gain, there might never have been a market for the artists’ 
work at all.46 
After World War II, New York City’s transition from a cultural 
follower to a cultural leader began with the art movement of 
abstract expressionism.47  Much like in France, contemporary art in 
New York attracted new buyers looking for both status symbols 
and investments.  Before the war American art was bought mostly 
by people with old money, but between 1940 and 1985 young 
entrepreneurs and business corporations became common buyers.48  
The old collectors were very hesitant to sell their art, but these new 
 
 42 See Nobuko Kawashima, The Droit de Suite Controversy Revisited: Context, Effects 
and the Price of Art, 3 INTELL. PROP. Q. 223, 233 (2006) (discussing that the commercial 
market of artworks made by living artists emerged also in Paris during the late nineteenth 
century); see also DIANA CRANE, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AVANT-GARDE: THE NEW 
YORK ART WORLD, 1940–1985 1 (1987) (citing Seuphor, a French art critic, who 
discussed that before the 1950s “nearly all the original conceptions came from Paris”). 
 43 See Kawashima, supra note 42, at 233. 
 44 See id. at 233–34. 
 45 See PIERREDON-FAWCETT, supra note 16, at 2–3.  
 46 See Kawashima, supra note 42, at 233. 
 47 See id. 
 48 See id. at 234. 
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buyers were much more willing to sell in order to make profits or 
to improve their collection.49 
With this change, the modern contemporary art market was 
born.  Sotheby’s and Christie’s, two of the biggest auction houses, 
began to hold regular contemporary art auctions.  Buying art 
started to be seen as an investment, albeit a risky one: much of the 
money coming into the art market came from speculators and art 
investment funds.50 
But the modern art market is a sophisticated machine with 
many more players than just artists and buyers.  As Professor John 
Henry Merryman, a chief opponent of droit de suite, puts it: 
The main components of the art world, in addition 
to artists, are dealers and auctioneers, collectors, 
museums and their professional personnel, art 
historians, and art critics and the art press.  Within 
the art world, the art market is the principal medium 
for the distribution of art and the compensation of 
artists.  The art world has an ecology, its own set of 
inner relationships and interdependencies.  As in 
other ecologies, what affects one part resounds 
throughout the system and is felt by all the others.51 
Accordingly, the value of art is dependent on many variables.  
While the quality of a painter’s craft is important, it also matters 
what the art press says about the art, where it is being exhibited, 
and who is buying it, for example. 
2. Primary and Secondary Art Markets 
The contemporary art market operates in two interdependent 
spheres: primary and secondary sales.  Primary sales take place, for 
the most part, in galleries and at art fairs, while secondary sales 
mostly occur at auctions.52 
 
 49 See id. 
 50 See id. (stating that the Robert Scull sale “is said to have been a watershed for the 
market of contemporary art, opening the gates to speculative investments in art”). 
 51 Merryman, supra note 3, at 105. 
 52 See id. at 105–06. 
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The primary art market no longer pits dealers against artists—
today’s gallery model has changed significantly since the “greedy” 
dealers were profiting off of Impressionist masters in the first few 
decades of the twenty-first century.  Modern galleries work on a 
consignment basis.53  Dealers take a commission from sales of 
art—often as much as fifty percent—but this means that the dealer 
benefits from a higher price just as the artist does, so there is no 
incentive to pay the artist less than the work is worth.  Moreover, 
dealers do not simply take an artist’s work and wait for the buyers 
to walk in.  The dealer spends much time promoting his artists—
usually through gallery exhibitions—and he must take a large risk 
by investing money up front for expenses such as storage, rent, 
advertising, and sometimes advances on future commissions to 
artists.54  The result is that contemporary art dealers are actually 
“genuinely interested in and capable of supporting and promoting 
the artist’s work”55 and have an interest in seeing the artist succeed 
as the “caretakers of artists’ careers.”56  The bottom line is that the 
dealer’s interests are no longer adversarial to those of the artists—
the dealer only gets rich if the artists get rich. 
The secondary art market is almost exclusively beneficial to 
work by artists who have already shown themselves to be a success 
on the primary market.  According to Merryman, only two or three 
hundred of the hundreds of thousands of working artists in 
America have a significant secondary market for their work.57  
This secondary market is heavily focused in New York City.  In 
fact, the United States accounts for over forty-three percent of the 
world’s contemporary art auctions, while the UK is home to thirty 
percent of such auctions, and France now only holds about 6.6%.58  
This disparity in market share is one of the factors that led to the 
 
 53 See id. at 105. 
 54 See id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Alice Gregory, On the Market: Sotheby’s. New York. 2009–Present, 13 N+1 185, 
188 (2012) (“[The dealers’] job is to develop those careers, and to establish relationships 
with buyers whose past purchasing habits show discernment.”). 
 57 Merryman, supra note 3, at 106. 
 58 See Kawashima, supra note 42, at 237 (stating the countries’ percentage of share 
and comparing them through an elaborated table titled “Table 1 fine art auction sales by 
country: 2003/2004 season”). 
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EU’s droit de suite directive in 2001: nations that had previously 
not implemented a droit de suite—including the U.S. and UK—
controlled a great majority of the world’s secondary market sales 
of contemporary art.59 
C. Overview of Directive 2001/84/EC 
1. Application of Droit de Suite 
With the disparity of market share of contemporary art sales in 
mind, the European Union passed its droit de suite directive in 
2001.60  The EU droit de suite applies to “graphic or plastic art 
such as pictures, collages, paintings, drawings, engravings, prints, 
lithographs, sculptures, tapestries, ceramics, glassware and 
photographs, provided they are made by the artist himself or are 
copies considered to be original works of art.”61  The directive 
imposes a tiered royalty scheme that ranges from four percent of 
the sale price up to the first €50,000 to 0.25% for the sale price 
above €500,000, with a maximum royalty of €12,500.62  The term 
of the resale royalty right is tied to the length of copyright, so it 
currently lasts for the life of the artist plus seventy years.63  The 
directive also allows for collective management organizations to 
collect the royalties and find the artists to whom they belong.64  
Importantly, the resale royalty right is inalienable and 
unwaiveable, so even if the artist transfers her copyright to a third 
party, she still retains her resale royalty right.65 
The directive required each Member State to implement a droit 
de suite law benefitting artists and their heirs by 2006,66 but it 
 
 59 See Council Directive 2001/84, 2001 O.J. (L 272) 32, 32 rec. 7, 8, 9 (EC) (“This 
right is therefore a factor which contributes to the creation of distortions in competition as 
well as displacement of sales within the Community.”). 
 60 See id. 
 61 Council Directive 2001/84, art. 2, 2001 O.J. (L 272) 32, 35 (EC). 
 62 See id. art. 4, at 35.  The directive allows for minimal wiggle room here, letting 
member states choose the minimum price for which the right applies as long as it is 
below €3,000.  It also allows the member states to set the highest royalty rate at five 
percent rather than four percent, but still sets the maximum royalty at €12,500. Id. 
 63 Id. art. 8, at 35; rec. 7, at 33.  
 64 Id. art. 6, at 35. 
 65 Id. art. 1, at 34. 
 66 Id. arts. 10, 12, at 36. 
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allowed countries like the UK, which did not already have a law in 
place to implement the Directive on a longer timeline.67  
Accordingly, the UK did not fully implement the directive until 
2012.68  Choosing to adhere to the longer deadlines, they applied 
the law to living artists in 2006, and expanded it to their heirs in 
2012.69 
2. Legal Justifications for the Directive 
In the recitals set forth before the directive’s adoption, the 
European Union had articulated moral and legal justifications for 
its enactment.  First and foremost, the droit de suite directive is a 
harmonization initiative.70  Recital 15 states: 
In view of the scale of divergences between national 
provisions it is therefore necessary to adopt 
harmonising measures to deal with disparities 
between the laws of the Member States in areas 
where such disparities are liable to create or 
maintain distorted conditions of competition.  It is 
not however necessary to harmonise every 
provision of the Member States’ laws on the resale 
right and, in order to leave as much scope for 
national decision as possible, it is sufficient to limit 
the harmonisation exercise to those domestic 
provisions that have the most direct impact on the 
functioning of the internal market.71 
The recitals also cite article 95 of the European Community 
Treaty as the legal basis for compelling member states to comply 
with the measure.72  Article 95 empowers the European Council to 
 
 67 Id. at art. 8. 
 68 See Chanont Banternghansa & Kathryn Graddy, The Impact of the Droit de Suite in 
the UK: An Empirical Analysis, Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper 
No. DP7136, 5 (Jan. 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1345662. 
 69 See id. at 3–5.  
 70 See Simon Stokes, Implementing the Artists’ Resale Right (droit de suite) Directive 
into English Law, 13 ENT. L. R. 153, 153 (2002).  
 71 Council Directive 2001/84, rec. 15, 2001 O.J. (L 272) 32, 33 (EC). 
 72 Id. rec. 10, at 32 (“Such disparities with regard to the existence of the resale right 
and its application by the Member States have a direct negative impact on the proper 
functioning of the internal market in works of art as provided for by Article 14 of the 
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administer directives that would eliminate obstacles to free trade.73  
Since the Council believes that the disparity between the art market 
in the UK and in France is at least in part due to the UK’s lack of a 
droit de suite, it felt justified in passing directive as a 
harmonization measure.  Whether droit de suite was actually a 
barrier to trade, however, is questionable.74 
A second legal justification for the directive is derived from 
article 12 of the European Community Treaty, which states that 
“all union citizens shall enjoy equal treatment with the nationals of 
that Member State.”75  This suggests that a Member State that 
offers a droit de suite to its citizens cannot bar EU citizens of other 
Member States from benefitting from such a right—even if that 
union citizen is from a nation that does not provide droit de suite.  
Therefore, member states could not use non-reciprocity as a bar to 
providing resale royalties, even though the Berne Convention 
allows for such a bar.76  This justification would be equally 
applicable to a directive that would eliminate droit de suite across 
Europe, or one that allows states to keep their droit de suite 
royalties at a level approximating the additional expenses of 
exporting a work to a different country.77 
3. Moral Justifications for the Directive 
The fact that the European Council opted to harmonize their 
laws by enacting a Union-wide droit de suite rather than 
 
Treaty. In such a situation Article 95 of the Treaty constitutes the appropriate legal 
basis.”). 
 73 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 
95(1), May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 86 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
 74 See Joerg Wuenschel, Article 95 EC Revisited: Is the Artist’s Resale Right Directive 
a Community Act Beyond EC Competence?, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 130, 132–34 
(2009).  Wuenschel presents early data that indicates that London’s secondary market 
dominance is not shifting to other European cities after harmonization.  This suggests that 
the barrier preventing Paris from matching the market in London is unrelated to droit de 
suite. Id. 
 75 TFEU, supra note 73, at art. 12. 
 76 See Berne Convention, supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 77 See David L. Booton, A Critical Analysis of the European Commission’s Proposal 
for a Directive Harmonising the Droit de Suite, 1998 INTELL. PROP. Q. 165, 185 (1998).  
This would minimize the threat of dealers exporting art out of a droit de suite country to 
sell it in a non-droit de suite country just to save on the royalty. 
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eliminating the right altogether, suggests that it accepted the moral 
justifications for the original French droit de suite law.  This is 
evident in the directive’s reference to the inequities between artists 
and other authors: 
The resale right is intended to ensure that authors of 
graphic and plastic works of art share in the 
economic success of their original works of art.  It 
helps to redress the balance between the economic 
situation of authors of graphic and plastic works of 
art and that of other creators who benefit from 
successive exploitations of their works.78 
The fact that the European Council believes that visual artists 
need greater economic protection suggests that the Council accepts 
the myth of the starving artist as a valid concern in need of a 
remedy.79  However, in the contemporary art market, established 
artists can make lucrative amounts of money on primary market 
sales and, accordingly, do not need greater economic protection.80  
Therefore, the right must primarily be intended to protect those 
young artists who have not yet established themselves in the art 
world.  But the value of art is in its uniqueness, whereas much of 
the value in literature and music is in its reproducibility, and the 
analogy between visual art and other creative works breaks down 
when it is examined with some scrutiny, as is discussed below.81 
 
 78 Council Directive 2001/84, rec. 3, 2001 O.J. (L 272) 32, 32 (EC). 
 79 See supra notes 21–25 and accompanying text.  Alternatively, this could simply 
suggest that the European Council believes that all artists, regardless of their success 
deserve increased protection.  Such a conclusion should require justification under either 
the labor theory of copyright, or the personhood theory of copyright, but both of these 
theories fail to justify a droit de suite as discussed infra in Part III.B. 
 80 See Merryman, supra note 3, at 107, 109 (explaining that successful artists do not 
starve and artistic genius does not go undiscovered).  
 81 See id. at 113–15 (addressing the argument that visual artists lack the opportunity to 
collect royalties, in contrast to authors and composers, thus stressing the need for droit de 
suite). 
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II. DROIT DE SUITE IN PRACTICE 
As of 2012, droit de suite has been fully enacted throughout the 
entire European Union.82  Yet scholars such as Merryman and 
others continue to argue that such a right is ineffective and 
unnecessary.83  Now that droit de suite is in effect in London, one 
of the major hubs of the contemporary art market, it will become 
easier to examine exactly how droit de suite works in conjunction 
with the contemporary art market.84  This section analyzes the 
current understandings of the efficacy of enforcement, the 
beneficiaries of the right, and the impact on markets in the UK and 
the United States with an emphasis on the disagreements between 
opponents and those who favor droit de suite. 
A. Enforcement of the Directive 
With full implementation of droit de suite now in effect in the 
EU, it is necessary for each country to find a way to adequately 
enforce the right.  Administrative costs can be a great burden, so 
most countries have collective management agencies that take the 
royalties and deliver them to the artists after taking a fee.85  This 
can potentially lead to issues with mismanagement and corruption.  
In France, there are twenty-seven different authors’ societies that 
collect droit de suite royalties.86  Victor Ginsburgh provides a 
picture of how these collecting agencies are run: 
The French copyright society SPADEM faced a 
financial crisis in 1996 and was placed under court-
ordered administration.  The Tribunal noted that its 
 
 82 See generally Council Directive 2001/84, 2001 O.J. (L 272) 32 (EC). 
 83 See generally Merryman, supra note 3 (stating that supporters of droit de suite will 
be “opposed by knowledgeable people who see the right as a textbook example of 
uninformed good intentions in support of a bad cause”). 
 84 See Kawashima, supra note 42, at 237. 
 85 See Mara Grumbo, Accepting Droit De Suite As an Equal and Fair Measure Under 
Intellectual Property Law and Contemplation of Its Implementation in the United States 
Post Passage of the EU Directive, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 357, 362 (2008) 
(discussing administrative costs of collecting royalties and the rates charged by various 
collection agencies). 
 86 See Victor Ginsburgh, The Economic Consequences of Droit de Suite in the 
European Union, 35 ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 61, 65 (2006) (discussing mismanagement 
of the twenty-seven French authors’ societies). 
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running costs, in particular staff salaries, could only 
be paid if the money, which should be used to pay 
artists’ dues, was drawn on.  ADAMI, another 
French authors’ society audited by the French 
Ministry of Finance, did not pay the royalties due to 
Sean Connery, Charles Bronson and Laura 
Antonelli because “it could not find their 
addresses.”  ADAMI also used money earmarked to 
promote artistic creation, to renovate its offices.  
SACEM, another French society, needs 1,490 
employees to manage the accounts of 12,000 
members . . . . The Danish society in charge of 
[droit de suite] takes as much as 40% of the 
royalty . . . . ADAGP, the French collecting agency, 
levies 20% before paying artists.87 
According to Ginsburgh, this data is nothing short of 
appalling.88  That is not to say, however, that enforcement is a total 
failure—the collecting agencies have been successful in keeping 
auction houses accountable, much like ASCAP and BMI have been 
successful in enforcing the rights of recording artists and 
composers in the United States.89  In 1990, over $17 million in 
royalties were collected and distributed to over 1,700 artists in 
France alone.90  Furthermore, collecting agencies tend to provide 
benefits to the art community beyond collecting and distributing 
royalties.91  For example, they are involved in lobbying for artists’ 
 
 87 Id. at 65.  
 88 See Ginsburgh, supra note 86, at 65 (referring to mismanagement of French authors’ 
societies as “frightening” and “wasteful”). 
 89 See Reddy, supra note 16, at 516–17 (noting that “the resale royalty is in reality only 
collected at auction” and that the French authors’ societies are “similar to ASCAP and 
BMI”). 
 90 Id. at 531 (“Jean-Marc Gutton, General Manager of ADAGP, testified that more 
than $17,000,000 in resale royalties were collected and distributed to more than 1700 
artists in 1990.”). 
 91 See Eliza Hall, The French Exception: Why the Resale Royalty Works in France and 
Why it Matters to the U.S., 1 J. INT’L MEDIA & ENT. L. 321, 335–37 (2007) (“[T]hese 
organizations [also] function as a means of sharing the wealth generated by the music 
industry, providing benefits to less-successful artists that are funded by the successful 
artists’ royalties.”). 
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rights and they often provide grants for artists.92  Outside of 
France, however, there are not many success stories.93 
The EU Directive mitigates administrative costs by setting a 
minimum sale price for which royalties may be applied.94  
Unfortunately, however, the cost of enforcement has still been 
fairly significant.  In a 2008 study of droit de suite in the UK, Toby 
Frauschauer concluded that the administrative cost of droit de suite 
is between €23.30 and €53.60 per sale (significantly greater than 
supporters’ prediction that costs would be €0.50 per sale).95 
Opponents of droit de suite cite the inefficiencies of enforcing 
droit de suite as a reason that the right should not exist.96  But 
proponents argue that poorly designed statutes create these 
inefficiencies, which can be ameliorated by implementing simpler 
collection requirements like those in France.97  Unfortunately, it 
will be several years before any reliable data on the efficacy of 
droit de suite in a major contemporary art hub like London will 
exist. 
B. Who Benefits from Droit de Suite 
Until very recently, there was little to no concrete data on who 
would actually benefit from droit de suite.  While the European 
Commission was first considering a droit de suite directive, some 
opponents suggested that it would only benefit the eight richest 
artists and their estates, but proponents argued it would actually 
 
 92 See id. (stating that “members of ASCAP and BMI . . . benefit from litigation and 
lobbying efforts whose cost would be beyond the means of the overwhelming majority of 
musicians and composers” and that in 2004 ASCAP put collected royalties toward grants 
for emerging songwriters). 
 93 See Merryman, supra note 3, at 115 (observing that of the twenty-nine jurisdictions 
that recognize the droit de suite right, twenty-four apply it “little or not at all”). 
 94 Council Directive 2001/84, rec. 22, 2001 O.J. (L 272) 32, 34 (EC) (stating that 
“minimum threshold may help to avoid disproportionately high collection and 
administration costs”). 
 95 See TOBY FROSCHAUER, THE IMPACT OF ARTIST RESALE RIGHTS ON THE ART 
MARKET IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 10 (2008) (“[A]uctioneers’ calculation of the 
transaction costs ranged between £23.30 and £53.60, depending on whether or not they 
had included set-up costs.”). 
 96 See Merryman, supra note 3, at 115 (explaining that one of the primary arguments 
against droit de suite is that it doesn’t work and most jurisdictions do not enforce it). 
 97 See PIERREDON-FAWCETT, supra note 16, at 106. 
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benefit closer to 250,000 artists in Europe alone.98  However, a 
study performed in 2005 suggests that between the years 2000 and 
2004 only 3,876 living artists had work sold at auction 
worldwide.99  During the same timeframe, the work of just slightly 
fewer than 10,000 deceased artists was sold at auction.100  It is 
important to note that these data do not account for private dealer 
sales outside of the realm of auctions, which are still subject to 
droit de suite.  Still, the numbers are drastically lower than the 
estimate calculating that 250,000 artists would benefit. 
Besides being limited to a smaller number of individuals than 
was originally expected, the lion’s share of droit de suite benefits 
are concentrated distinctly among a select few artists and estates.  
Overall, heirs of deceased artists receive around eighty-five 
percent of droit de suite royalties.101  In France, four deceased 
artists—Picasso, Braque, Matisse, and Leger (none of which were 
starving artists)—account for close to seventy percent of all droit 
de suite royalties.102  Opponents of droit de suite suggest that any 
right that so disproportionately benefits wealthy creators is 
undesirable.103  Proponents counter by arguing that “it would be 
unreasonable to expect all fine artists to forfeit this potentially 
lucrative reward simply because, as in any other enterprise, those 
who have the greatest success will benefit the most.”104  That the 
wealthiest artist will benefit the most is merely a “fact of life.”105  
Even very small royalty payments would be beneficial to artists 
who are struggling to make ends meet through their primary 
market sales.106 
 
 98 See European Commission, Proposed Directive on Artists’ Resale Right—
Clarification MEMO/99/68, 14 December 1999, 1 (“Within the EU as a whole, 
approximately 250,000 artists would benefit from the resale right. Any suggestion that 
the resale right would benefit only eight rich families (e.g. Picasso’s heirs) is therefore 
inaccurate.”). 
 99 Ginsburgh, supra note 86, at 66. 
 100 Id. (“The work of 9,987 deceased artists was sold during the same period.”). 
 101 Id. at 66. 
 102 M. Franklin Boyd, Presentation on Artists’ Resale Royalty Rights (Mar. 6, 2012) 
(slides on file with author). 
 103 See Merryman, supra note 3, at 117. 
 104 Reddy, supra note 16, at 531. 
 105 Id. 
 106 See id. 
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C. Impact in the UK 
Because its strong contemporary art market dwarfs those of the 
rest of Europe, the United Kingdom was one of the strongest 
opponents to passing the EU droit de suite directive and the most 
stubborn when it came time to implement it.107  The United 
Kingdom was concerned that droit de suite would harm the art 
market and send auction sales to countries without droit de suite, 
such as the United States and Switzerland.  However, one recent 
empirical study suggests droit de suite has not had a significant 
impact on auction sales: 
The worst predictions regarding the effect on the 
UK art market from the implementation of the [droit 
de suite] have not been realized.  We have not seen 
a reduction in price growth for art subject to the 
[droit de suite] in the UK relative to other countries 
or other markets and we have not found evidence of 
a movement of paintings from the UK to other 
venues where the [droit de suite] would not be 
applied.108 
This report suggests that implementing droit de suite has 
actually had little effect on European trade.109  However, the report 
also suggests that once droit de suite is expanded to the heirs of 
deceased artists, “it may become harder for buyers to ignore the 
impact and the [droit de suite] may increasingly be factored into 
their valuations,” leading to a potential drop in prices of up to 
twenty-four percent.110  Although this report suggests there has not 
been a shift in locations of sales, there is anecdotal evidence to the 
contrary.  For example, in 2001, UNICEF sold the £50,000,000 
 
 107 The UK implemented droit de suite for living artists in 2006, and did not provide the 
right to heirs of deceased artists until 2012. See Daniel Grant, “Droit de Suite” Debate 
Heats Up, ARTNEWS, Jan. 11, 2012, available at http://www.artnews.com/2012/01/11/ 
droit-de-suite-debate-heats-up. 
 108 Banternghansa & Graddy, supra note 68, at 33. 
 109 See id.  This also suggests that unharmonized droit de suite laws never were an 
actual barrier to free trade and the harmonization element of the EC’s droit de suite 
directive was therefore entirely unnecessary.  It is important to note, though, that this 
does not mean that droit de suite has not had an impact on the primary art market. 
 110 Id. at 34. 
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Gaffé collection in New York rather than France specifically so 
that it could avoid the droit de suite fee.111 
The impact of droit de suite might not be limited to auction 
sales.  The interdependence of primary market sales and secondary 
market112 sales means that the primary market should also expect 
to see changes with the implementation of droit de suite.  One 
recent economic model suggests that the new droit de suite in the 
UK will result in less art being made.113  Under this model, droit de 
suite does encourage production of art among well-established 
artists later in their career, but only at the expense of young artists 
and art consumers.114  But droit de suite proponents argue that 
these models assume that collectors only buy art for investment 
purposes, whereas many collectors buy art purely for its aesthetic 
appeal.115 
D.  Droit de Suite in the United States 
Despite multiple attempts at passing federal and state droit de 
suite legislation, the right has never been effectively enforced in 
the United States.  Until recently, California was the only U.S. 
state with a resale royalty right.116  The California statute closely 
mirrored the EU Directive, but with a simpler, flat, uncapped 
royalty of five percent on all secondary sales of “fine art.”117  In 
May 2012, however, a California trial court ruled that the droit de 
suite directive violated the dormant commerce clause of the U.S. 
Constitution by applying outside the state of California in certain 
instances.118  Despite the fact that the statute includes a severability 
clause, the court ruled that the portion of the statute that applies 
beyond the state’s borders could not be severed and the entire 
 
 111 Ginsburgh, supra note 86, at 68. 
 112 See supra notes 52–59 and accompanying text. 
 113 See Gyu Ho Wang, The Resale Royalty Right and its Economic Effects, 15 J. OF 
ECON. RESEARCH 171, 181 (2010). 
 114 See id. (“[T]he resale royalty right has a harmful effect on both the consumer surplus 
and the social welfare.”). 
 115 See Reddy, supra note 16, at 529. 
 116 See supra notes 33–37 and accompanying text. 
 117 See Cal. Civ. Code § 986 (West 2012), invalidated by Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s 
Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 
 118 See Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 
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statute was declared invalid.119  Pending appeal, this means there is 
no longer any droit de suite in the United States. 
Besides violating the dormant commerce clause, the California 
statute has a number of other issues that some scholars suggest 
would make it invalid or at least ineffective even if an appeal were 
to successfully reverse the unseverability decision.  First of all, the 
statute seems to be preempted by federal copyright law.120  The 
Copyright Act of 1976 states that any right that falls within the 
general scope of copyright law is preempted by the Act.121  While 
it is not clear that a droit de suite would fall within the general 
scope of copyright law, the fact that Congress considered including 
the right in the Visual Artists’ Rights Act (which is encoded as part 
of the Copyright Act),122 suggests that it might be.  The California 
law has previously withstood preemption scrutiny,123 but only 
under the Copyright Act of 1909, which did not include a 
preemption clause as the current act does.124 
Secondly, even if the California droit de suite were 
constitutional, it would be very difficult to enforce.  The statute 
requires that in the event of a reseller’s failure to comply with the 
law, an artist must bring a suit himself125—something most artists 
cannot afford to do.  Furthermore, various privacy interests of 
buyers interfere with the application of the statute.126  Auction 
houses are notoriously secretive about buyers and sellers of fine art 
 
 119 See id. at 1126.  
 120 Anandashankar Mazumdar, Two Lawsuits by Artists May Test Validity of California 
Resale Royalty Rights Statute, UCIRA, http://www.ucira.ucsb.edu/two-lawsuits-by-
artists-may-test-validity-of-california-resale-royalty-rights-statute (last visited June 15, 
2012). 
 121 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006). 
 122 See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 608(b), 80 Stat. 
5089 (1990). 
 123 See generally Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1980) (This case was 
brought by an art dealer arguing that the California Resale Royalty Act was preempted by 
the 1909 Copyright Act.). 
 124 See id. 
 125 Cal. Civ. Code § 986(a)(3) (West 2012), invalidated by Estate of Graham v. 
Sotheby’s Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 
 126 See generally Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s Inc., 860 F.Supp.2d 1117 (CD Cal. 
2012); Francis Foundation v. Christie’s Inc. No. 2:11-cv-08605-SVW-PJW (C.D. Cal. 
filed Oct. 18, 2011). 
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so it is difficult for artists to know when their works are being sold 
by California residents (as is evidenced by a pair of lawsuits filed 
in California in 2011).127  As a result, this droit de suite statute has 
generally been ineffective in the past. 
In sum, because of the perceived high cost of enforcement and 
the skewed royalty payments that favor wealthy artists, many 
scholars and other opponents such as museums, dealers, and some 
artists argue against further implementation of droit de suite.  
However, proponents of the right, including established artists like 
Robert Rauschenberg, believe that droit de suite is favorable 
because the artist’s own genius and reputation is the most direct 
cause of an increase in the value of a work sold at auction, and 
therefore, the artist deserves to share in that windfall.128  This 
argument, coupled with anecdotes about artists such as Millet and 
Rauschenberg, and the desire to correct the imbalance between the 
economic rights in the creative work of visual artists and other 
authors has been sufficient to keep droit de suite expanding over 
the last decade.  Yet as legislators and established artists continue 
to push for more droit de suite legislation throughout the world, 
scholars continue to disagree on the appeal of the right.  I attempt 
to resolve this conflict in the next section not only through a 
careful analysis of policy considerations, but also a review of 
copyright justification theories, which until now have not been 
included in droit de suite discussions. 
III. DROIT DE SUITE CONFLICTS WITH COMMON LAW POLICY 
CONSIDERATIONS AND FAILS TO COMPLY WITH COPYRIGHT THEORY 
With the full implementation of droit de suite in the UK, there 
is now strong international pressure to expand the right globally.129  
The U.S. Copyright Office suggested reconsidering droit de suite if 
 
 127 See Mazumdar, supra note 120. 
 128 See Merryman, supra note 3, at 111. 
 129 See Victoria Till, Defeated or Deferred? Why a Resale Royalty was Rejected in 
Australia, 13 INT’L J.  CULTURAL  POL’Y 287, 289 (2007) (quoting the English House of 
Commons report stating “[T]he Government should renew its efforts to achieve universal 
adoption of droit de suite, through all available international channels”). 
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Europe implemented the right,130 and, accordingly, the House and 
Senate have each proposed bills that, if passed, would implement 
droit de suite in the United States.131  Furthermore, in late 2011, 
artists in California finally started using the judicial system to fight 
the auction houses that were not paying out royalties in accordance 
with that state’s droit de suite.132  The demise of the California 
statute that resulted from those 2011 lawsuits could potentially 
bring about louder cries for a federal law by droit de suite 
proponents.  It seems that pressure to expand droit de suite is 
building and could lead to a possibility of further implementation 
across the globe.133  But common law nations such as the United 
States should resist this pressure because a number of policy 
considerations weigh heavily against further implementation, and 
because such a law lacks a basis in copyright theory. 
A. Policy Considerations Weigh Against Further Droit de Suite 
Implementation 
Besides the fact that droit de suite cannot sit comfortably 
within any traditional justification for intellectual property rights, 
as will be discussed below, simple policy considerations weigh 
against it.  For example, the resale royalty right is based on an 
archaic art market and unproven mythology, it contradicts the 
utilitarian ideals used as the basis for copyright in most common 
law nations, it contradicts notions of property law, and it relies on a 
false assumption that artists are naïve and easily taken advantage 
of.  In addition to being an administrative burden, its benefits 
simply would not outweigh its costs. 
1. The Art Market Has Changed Since France Originally 
Implemented Droit de Suite 
Since the European Council chose to compel member nations 
to enact droit de suite laws, it seemingly accepted the original 
moral justification France adhered to when passing it in 1920.  
 
 130 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF. REG. OF COPYRIGHTS, DROIT DE SUITE: THE ARTIST’S 
RESALE ROYALTY 149 (1992). 
 131 See S. 2000, 122th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011); H.R. 3688, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011). 
 132 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 133 See Till, supra note 129, at 289. 
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Therefore, one can surmise that the starving artist/greedy dealer 
myth—Jean-Francois Millet’s family starving while his painting 
Angelus was sold for one million francs by his dealer134—was 
accepted by the Council as a moral justification for the directive 
(though this justification was likely secondary to the political 
demands of France’s secondary art market and the collective 
management organizations who enforce and benefit from droit de 
suite laws). 
The reality of the myth of the starving artist is itself 
questionable.  Even in the early twentieth century when droit de 
suite was initially gaining support, poor artists like Van Gogh and 
Gauguin were the exception, not the rule.135  In fact, many of the 
best artists earned considerable wealth from their art during their 
lives.136  Today, an average artist earns an income comparable to 
an average worker—artists are by and large not starving.137  In 
fact, artists consistently earn more than other authors such as poets 
or playwrights.138 
Once the myth of the starving artist is shattered, it is clear that 
visual artists are no more deserving of additional intellectual 
property protections than any other creator.  It makes little sense to 
analogize artists to recording artists and writers who make money 
from the royalties on the reproduction of their work.  Artists make 
money on the sale of chattels.  The value in visual art is in the 
unique quality of each piece.  Each individual piece of art can only 
be “consumed” by a single owner at a time, whereas a writer’s 
novel, for example, can be reproduced and sold to thousands of 
readers at once at marginally low costs. 
 
 134 See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text. 
 135 See BRUNO S. FREY, ART & ECONOMICS: ANALYSIS & CULTURAL POLICY 30 (2d ed. 
2003). 
 136 See id.  (citing as examples such artists as Rubens, Tiziano, Rembrandt, Lenbach, 
Stuck, Picasso, and Beuys). 
 137 See Elliott C. Alderman, Resale Royalties in the United States for Fine Visual 
Artists: An Alien Concept, 40 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 265, 281 (1992).  It may 
warrant noting, however, that many artists are forced to work second jobs in addition to 
making art because it is difficult to make sales.  Furthermore, many artists struggle to get 
paid by their gallerists, even when they have successful exhibitions, due to poorly 
managed galleries or questionable business practices. 
 138 See Stephen E. Weil, Resale Royalties: Nobody Benefits, ARTNEWS, Mar. 1978, at 
59. 
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Even among visual artists, the resale royalty is unevenly 
applied—as video artists and performance artists often live off 
grant money because their work cannot be sold, they would not 
benefit at all from resale royalties.  But the work produced by these 
artists can be just as culturally significant as paintings and 
sculptures.  If traditional artists are worthy of additional copyright-
related protection, then so are these artists, but droit de suite fails 
to provide such protection. 
Finally, today’s art market is vastly different from that of early 
twentieth century France.  Dealers now work on consignment 
rather than by attempting to “take advantage” of poor artists.139  So 
contemporary art galleries set fair prices and artists receive market 
value for their work.  Furthermore, artists are not solely 
responsible for their own success.  Without gallery representation 
and a dealer’s investments in their careers, artists have little hope 
of ever making a profit on their work.  And when an artist retains a 
resale royalty right in each piece of art he sells, then buyers are 
likely to demand a discount on the original sale, reducing the profit 
for both the artist and the dealer.  Therefore, awarding a royalty 
solely to artists hurts the dealers that put the artists in a position to 
profit at auction in the first place. 
2. Droit de Suite Contradicts Common Law Copyright 
Doctrine and Property Rights 
As will be discussed below, droit de suite fails to completely 
satisfy the traditional theories used to justify copyright.140  Droit de 
suite fits more in line with the civil law personhood theory of 
copyright, if it fits within any theory at all.  Utilitarianism, the 
theory most prevalent in common law nations, is based on the idea 
that copyright protection exists to incentivize authors to create 
culturally significant works.141  But droit de suite does not 
incentivize creation of work; it might even stifle creation.142 
 
 139 See Merryman, supra note 3. 
 140 See infra Part III.B. 
 141 See Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author 
Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright Law, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 1, 9–13 (1994) (explaining that U.S. copyright law treats copyright rights like 
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Furthermore, droit de suite contradicts the well-established first 
sale doctrine, which extinguishes an author’s right in a particular 
copy of a creative work once it is sold.143  This doctrine is meant to 
prevent copyright protection from interfering with common law 
property rights—specifically, the free alienability of property.144  A 
droit de suite would put a restriction on alienability.  Such 
restrictions have been highly frowned upon by Anglo-American 
courts for centuries.145  If legislators want to provide extra 
economic protections to one profession such as visual artists, they 
must consider what sets them apart from other producers.  Should 
the royalty be extended to architects each time a building he 
designs is resold, or makers of furniture and other utilitarian 
design?  Should a royalty be paid to a winery when its rare wine is 
sold at auction?  And what about used car sales?  Surely an 
automotive designer is proud of the creative work she puts into the 
car model she designs, but nobody would suggest that she deserves 
to be compensated each time the car is resold at a used car lot.146  
None of these craftsmen receive resale royalties because such a 
device would be a restriction on alienability, and free alienability is 
necessary to promote the most efficient use of property.147 
The manner in which art is consumed is more closely related to 
these goods than to literature or music, so there is no reason to 
conflate the value of art’s intellectual property with the value of its 
physical property in order to create additional financial benefits 
only for visual artists.  Doing so would be inconsistent with well-
accepted common law property doctrine. 
 
commodities and that alienability is necessary to reap the monetary rewards of 
intellectual labor). 
 142 See supra notes 112–14 and accompanying text.  
 143 See Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’Anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 141–
42 (1998) (discussing Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908) (holding that 
copyright cannot be extended beyond the first sale of a copy so as to place a restriction on 
subsequent alienations of the copy)). 
 144 See id.  
 145 See Glen O. Robinson, Explaining Contingent Rights: The Puzzle of “Obsolete” 
Covenants, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 546, 568 (1991). 
 146 Some commentators suggest the right would be good for the sale of used CDs and 
DVDs. See Ken Lovern, Evaluating Resale Royalties for Used CDs, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 113 (1994). 
 147 See id.  
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3. Droit de Suite Wrongly Assumes Artists Cannot Protect 
Themselves 
The unwaiveability and inalienability of droit de suite assumes 
artists are so naïve that they cannot bargain away their rights for 
value.  All other economic intellectual property rights are 
assignable or waiveable because this gives authors bargaining 
power and maximizes an author’s opportunities for income.148  But 
droit de suite is traditionally unwaiveable and inalienable.  
Proponents of droit de suite suggest that this is necessary because 
of the unequal bargaining power between young artists and 
buyers.149  But this viewpoint is based on an archaic understanding 
of the art market.  Since the relationship between artists and 
dealers is now more symbiotic than predatory, artists have 
significantly greater bargaining power than they did in the early 
twentieth century.150 
In practice, the unwaiveability and inalienability of droit de 
suite acts as a forced investment.  Consider the following likely 
scenario: a buyer who knows he retains less than 100% of a work’s 
future resale value will perceive the current value of a work to be 
lower than if he were to retain the entire future resale value.  That 
buyer will then pay less for the work that he values less.  
Theoretically, the artist can make up this difference if that work is 
ever resold for a profit on the secondary market—but the 
likelihood of any given work being resold on the secondary market 
is quite low.  An unwaiveable droit de suite, then, essentially 
forces an artist to forego income on a first sale based on the 
speculation that his work will later increase in value and sell on the 
secondary market.  But the young artist would realize a greater 
benefit from a higher sale price earlier in his career—when sales 
may not be as easy to come by—than he would from royalties later 
in his career when he is already successful.  Moreover, if the work 
is never resold, the artist will never make that money back. 
 
 148 See Netanel, supra note 141.  
 149 See Merryman, supra note 3, at 123. 
 150 See supra notes 51–56 and accompanying text. 
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Artists are not so naïve.  In fact, some European artists who 
have the resale royalty right would rather it didn’t exist.151  
Currently, in the United States, an artist can choose to include a 
resale royalty in his contract of sale or he can choose to leave it 
out, but with an unwaiveable droit de suite right in place, that artist 
could not sell 100% of the property interest in his work even if he 
wanted to. 
4. Droit de Suite Primarily Benefits Those Who do not Need 
Additional Economic Protection 
At bottom, droit de suite simply fails to improve upon the 
issues it was originally designed to address.  After the collective 
agencies take their cut, most artists receive very little, if 
anything.152  And the artists that truly benefit from the right are the 
ones who need it the least.153  Secondary market sales are rare for 
an average artist, and not to be expected until late in the artist’s 
career.154  Proponents of the right argue that “[e]ven a royalty of 
fifty dollars may allow an artist to purchase supplies sufficient to 
create her next work of art—or to pay the electric bill, allowing her 
to continue to create rather than devoting all her time and energy to 
finding another job.”155  The problem with this argument is that 
those artists who are devoting all their time to finding another job 
because they are not making sales on the primary market will not 
receive any royalty as there is no secondary market for 
unsuccessful artists.  By the time an artist is successful enough to 
have her work sold on the secondary market she is likely making 
enough on primary sales to live quite comfortably.  Droit de suite 
threatens to take money out of the pockets of young aspiring artists 
 
 151 See Patricia Cohen, Artists File Lawsuit, Seeking Royalties, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 
2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/02/arts/design/artists-file-suit-
against-sothebys-christies-and-ebay.html?pagewanted=1&_r=3 (“The arrival of [droit de 
suite] will do little or nothing for the vast majority of British artists.  It will undoubtedly 
envelop the market, on which we as artists depend, in red tape, and it will discourage art 
dealers from buying particularly the work of emerging artists.”). 
 152 See supra notes 86–95 and accompanying text.  
 153 See supra notes 98–102 and accompanying text. 
 154 See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text. 
 155 Shira Perlmutter, Resale Royalties for Artists: An Analysis of the Register of 
Copyrights’ Report, 40 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 284 (1993). 
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when they need it most, and that is the opposite result lawmakers 
likely hope for.156 
B.  Droit de Suite Under Three Theories of Copyright 
Despite the policy considerations that weigh heavily against 
droit de suite, the resale royalty right has gained increasing 
acceptance since the 1960s.  In previous scholarship, the policy 
debate is where the droit de suite discussion ended.  An analysis of 
copyright theory and its relation to droit de suite should strengthen 
the opposition to the unsuccessful right. 
While France’s system of copyright is based on a personality 
theory,157 the United States and other common law nations have 
traditionally justified copyright law with a utilitarian rationale.158  
Both of these systems of copyright have evolved over the years, 
however, and scholars now recognize that a mix of utilitarian 
theory and personality theory, as well as Lockean labor theory, 
justifies most copyright regimes. 
A comprehensive awareness of how an intellectual property 
right fits within these theories aids lawmakers’ ability to effect 
better intellectual property policy.159  This section will briefly 
discuss each of the three most widely accepted theories of 
copyright and analyze droit de suite under each in order to show 
that lawmakers should resist creating droit de suite rights in nations 
that do not already have them. 
 
 156 Assuming the original justification for the French droit de suite of providing 
additional income to poor artists is still the goal of the law, lawmakers would prefer to 
see young aspiring artists benefit over wealthy established artists. 
 157 See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text. 
 158 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts”). 
 159 William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 169, 194 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001).  Fisher 
describes how an analysis of intellectual property theory as it relates to the right of 
publicity has shown that the right of publicity is difficult to justify.  As a result, what was 
once “a self-evident legal right, needing little intellectual rationalization to justify its 
existence” is now a significantly weakened right that is not as widely accepted. Id. at 195 
(quoting J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 1.1[B][2], at 1–5 
(1992)). 
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1. Personality Theory 
Personality theory is based largely on the philosophy of Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.160  Margaret Jane Radin has more 
recently tailored Hegel’s philosophy to the context of intellectual 
property.161  Simply put, this theory suggests that an artist should 
own intellectual property in her creation because the work is an 
extension of the artist’s self.162  Hegel writes that “[a]ttainments, 
eruditions, talents, and so forth, are, of course, owned by free mind 
and are something internal and not external to it, but even so, by 
expressing them it may embody them in something external and 
alienate them.”163  That is, expressions of the mind become 
property outside of the mind even though they might not be 
tangible “things.”164  Control of intellectual property in one’s work 
is necessary “for self-actualization, for personal expression, and for 
dignity and recognition as an individual person.”165  Creation, and 
more importantly, ownership in what is created, is therefore a 
fundamental element of humanity and necessary for flourishing in 
life. 
Unlike other theories, which try to equate intellectual property 
with tangible property, personality theory treats the two differently.  
Thus, the breadth of one’s exclusive control over intellectual 
property under this theory may differ from that exercised over 
property such as land or chattels.  In fact, Hegel himself disfavored 
exclusive control over tangible property but saw intellectual 
property as much more personal and therefore much more 
deserving of strong protection than real property.166 
Personality theory also differs from other theories of copyright 
in that it does not focus on the financial fruit of intellectual 
 
 160 See generally G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford 
University Press 1967) (1821). 
 161 See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 
(1982). 
 162 See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 330–
34 (1988). 
 163 HEGEL, supra note 160, at ¶ 43. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Hughes, supra note 162, at 330. 
 166 See id. at 334; see also id. at 348 (explaining that Hegel disfavored alienation of 
intellectual property rights, considering it to be morally analogous to slavery or suicide). 
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property.  Instead, personality theory puts high value on moral 
rights such as recognition of a creator and maintaining the integrity 
of the work.  Monetary gains from intellectual property are merely 
secondary, as Professor Justin Hughes explains: “[f]rom the 
Hegelian perspective, payments from intellectual property users to 
the property creator are acts of recognition [that] acknowledge the 
individual’s claim over the property, and it is through such 
acknowledgement that an individual is recognized by others as a 
person.”167  Hughes goes on to state that “[e]ven for starving 
artists, recognition of this sort [respect, honor, and admiration] 
may be far more valuable than economic rewards.”168 
This is the theory of copyright under which droit de suite was 
born, and it is the theory in which droit de suite sits most 
comfortably.  Under other theories of property and intellectual 
property, one may encounter opposition when attempting to collect 
a royalty on the resale of an object that has already been sold 
outright, but under personality theory, the idea that the object is an 
extension of the creator’s identity holds some weight. 
But personality theory does not require that resellers go so far 
as to pay the artist a second time for the artist’s work—the theory 
is more concerned with moral rights such as ensuring that resellers 
properly acknowledge the creator.  Receipt of monetary payment 
has only a very minor and indirect effect on the development of 
one’s personality.169  Since droit de suite looks more like an 
economic right than a moral one, it is difficult to justify it under a 
theory that gives little appreciation to the monetary value of 
intellectual property.170  This highlights a primary reason why 
many scholars are uncomfortable with accepting and promoting 
droit de suite (besides the fact that it is unlikely to work in 
practice)—it is an economic right founded on the principles of 
moral rights.  This schizophrenia feels misplaced under whichever 
theory of copyright one may advocate.  Furthermore, the monetary 
payment does nothing to protect the integrity of the artist’s work, 
and although it can be seen as an acknowledgement of the identity 
 
 167 Id. at 349 (citing HEGEL, supra note 160, at ¶ 71). 
 168 Id. at 350. 
 169 See id. at 349. 
 170 See id. 
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of the creator of the work, the caption in the auction house’s 
catalog listing the artist’s name is a simpler and more effective 
form of acknowledgment. 
At bottom, the droit de suite does little to promote the goals of 
the personality theory of copyright.  When a painting or other form 
of visual art is sold on the secondary market, the painting is valued 
because the work’s integrity has been maintained and its creator is 
correctly identified—the sale alone (assuming it is a successful 
sale) promotes the dignity and recognition of the artist, with or 
without a pecuniary payment.  To be fair, a royalty on that sale 
does nothing to harm the painter’s personality, but due to its 
economic nature, it would be better to find justification elsewhere. 
2. Utilitarian Theory 
Utilitarian theory is the original basis for the progress clause in 
the U.S. Constitution,171 and has been embraced by the Supreme 
Court of the United States in Fox Film Corp v. Doyal.172  Under 
this theory, intellectual property rights are meant to maximize 
economic wealth by incentivizing the progress of science and 
useful arts.  This incentive comes in the form of exclusivity, which 
gives the author an opportunity to exploit her own work without 
worrying about others trying to piggyback on her creativity.  Judge 
Richard Posner and Professor William Landes explain that: 
[a] distinguishing characteristic of intellectual 
property is its ‘public good’ aspect.  While the cost 
of creating a work subject to copyright 
protection . . . is often high, the cost of reproducing 
the work, whether by the creator or by those to 
whom he has made it available, is often low. . . . 
Copyright protection . . . trades off the costs of 
limiting access to a work against the benefits of 
providing incentives to create the work in the first 
place. . . . For copyright law to promote economic 
 
 171 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts”). 
 172 286 U.S. 123, 127–28 (1932) (“A copyright, like a patent, is ‘at once the equivalent 
given by the public for benefits bestowed by the genius and meditations and skill of 
individuals, and the incentive to further efforts for the same important objects.’”). 
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efficiency, its principal legal doctrines must, at least 
approximately, maximize the benefits from creating 
additional works minus both the losses from 
limiting access and the costs of administering 
copyright protection.173 
This is the foundation of utilitarian copyright theory.  
Copyright protection is meant to offset the “cost of expression.”174  
Without some exclusivity, the author would be unable to afford to 
create the work in the first place—and therefore would create 
nothing.175 
This theory requires a certain balancing act.  Although greater 
protection is meant to create greater incentive for creation, it may 
also cause the price of works to increase, which could actually chill 
progress instead of promoting it.176  Likewise, greater copyright 
protection decreases the value of copies of intellectual products 
because the buyer is restricted from using them in certain ways. 
To justify droit de suite under the utilitarian theory, one must 
show that it encourages artists to create art and to move art 
forward.  But evidence suggests it does the exact opposite—by 
cutting into the potential profits that can be realized on the 
secondary market, droit de suite theoretically drives down the 
primary market price of work created by young artists on the 
primary market and acts as a disincentive to create work.177  
Therefore, droit de suite disturbs the balancing act between rights 
of authors and rights of consumers, and as a result, it is difficult to 
justify droit de suite under the utilitarian theory. 
Of course, it is not fair to ignore the evidence that suggests that 
a select few more established artists are likely to create more work 
as a result of droit de suite.178  But the fact remains that the total 
amount of art expected to be produced with a droit de suite is less 
 
 173 William J. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989). 
 174 Id. at 327. 
 175 See Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values 
in Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 841, 854 (1993). 
 176 See Fisher, supra note 159. 
 177 See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text. 
 178 See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
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than the total amount of art expected to be produced without it.179  
Furthermore, work by established artists is less likely to promote 
the progress of visual art than the work of young artists.180  So 
even if droit de suite encourages creation and increases financial 
gain for some, it still fails to incentivize progress in art overall 
because it discourages creation for many.181 
Proponents of droit de suite argue that a conclusion that the 
right would depress the prices of primary market sales is based on 
a model that assumes art buyers only buy art as an investment.182  
But since many art collectors purchase art for its aesthetic appeal, 
and not for its investment value, a droit de suite should not impact 
primary market prices.  However, this argument fails to recognize 
that even if most collectors buy for aesthetic appeal, they are still 
mostly shrewd businessmen.  Whether or not the purchase is for 
investment purposes, a buyer is going to try to get the best price, 
and even the least sophisticated buyers can understand that partial 
ownership of a piece of art is not worth as much as full ownership 
of a piece of art.  Accordingly, it is reasonable to accept the 
aforementioned economic model’s conclusions regardless of why 
people buy art. 
Additionally, droit de suite was conceived as a way to correct 
the lack of benefits artists received from copyright protection.183  
But artists may not even need such benefits because the market for 
 
 179 See id. 
 180 While it is difficult to say exactly what constitutes progress in visual art, we can be 
sure that stasis is not progress.  Artists who have established themselves successfully 
enough to have a secondary market for their work are likely to continue to make more 
work similar to what made them successful and then eventually stop making work as they 
age.  This pattern looks more like stasis than progress.  In the fields of science and 
technology, progress is generally accepted as innovation, this is why patents require 
novelty.  Likewise, in visual art, progress requires innovation, or a development of new 
expressions that build upon old ones.  Most art galleries and dealers invest much of their 
efforts in discovering new artists with new ideas and new ways of thinking about art 
because these are the artists who move the industry forward.  For one discussion of 
progress in art, see generally Henry F. Gilbert, Progress in Art, 6 THE MUSICAL Q. 159 
(1920). 
 181 This statement is based only on economic models that may not, in fact, represent 
true behavior in the real world, but utilitarian copyright theory depends entirely on such 
economic models.  
 182 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 183 See supra notes 21–32 and accompanying text. 
C06_BUSSEY (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2013  3:46 PM 
1098 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 23:1063 
artwork differs from the market for easily copied intellectual 
products like books and music recordings.184  That is, copying a 
book or a recording takes no creative talent or skill, and the 
process can be digitally automated, so these products are easily 
reproduced and distributed en masse, but copying a painting or 
sculpture requires the copyist to possess a certain degree of 
technique (though it does not require creativity).185  As a result, 
legal copies of literary and musical works sell for very little while 
original paintings sell for very high prices.  So the exclusivity of 
copyright protection is not likely a necessary incentive for a visual 
artist to create work.  Similarly, increasing copyright protection by 
creating a resale royalty right is also unnecessary to incentivize the 
creation of art.  Droit de suite therefore fails to fit within the 
bounds of utilitarian theory. 
3. Labor Theory 
Labor theory is based on the work of John Locke.186  Locke 
suggests that property rights are derived from one’s labor.  The 
traditional interpretation187 of Locke’s theory states that since each 
individual at a minimum owns himself and his labor, therefore he 
also owns the fruit of his labor—that is, anything which he takes 
out of “the commons” (all that is in the world prior to being 
improved upon) and improves upon through his labor.188  Rather 
than focusing on incentives to maximize wealth as under the 
utilitarian theory, the Labor theory suggests that an individual 
deserves to own the fruit of his labor—whether or not the 
ownership encourages progress of any kind.189  Applied to 
 
 184 See supra Part III.A.1. 
 185 In Bridgeman Art Library Ltd. v. Corel Corp, 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999), the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York explained 
that technical skill and effort required for slavishly copying a work of art do not amount 
to the “creative spark” required for copyright protection.  
 186 See generally JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1689); see also 
Hughes, supra note 162, at 296.  
 187 For another view, see generally Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Lockean Arguments for 
Private Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF 
PROPERTY 138 (Stephen R. Munzer, ed., 2001). 
 188 See LOCKE, supra note 186, at 2d treatise, § 85; see also Hughes, supra note 162, at 
297. 
 189 See Hughes, supra note 162, at 298. 
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intellectual property, this theory suggests that an author should 
have exclusive ownership of creative expressions, which are 
improvements on unexpressed ideas found in “the commons.” 
An alternative understanding of Locke’s labor theory, however, 
suggests that Locke’s labor theory does not apply so easily to 
intellectual property.190  For instance, Seana Shiffrin argues that 
Locke only endorsed private ownership if “things of that sort [are] 
susceptible to justified private ownership,”191 and some of Locke’s 
writings indicate that he opposed intellectual property rights 
because they are not the sort of things that ought to be owned 
privately.192 
Whether or not Locke approved of intellectual property may be 
irrelevant, though, as labor theory has evolved beyond Locke’s 
writings, and it is generally accepted as one possible justification 
for intellectual property.193  Instead of focusing on whether Locke 
approved of such rights himself, one should ask why “labor upon a 
resource ‘in common’ entitle[s] the laborer to a property right in 
the resource itself?”194  Fisher suggests that Locke provided a 
number of answers to such a question—some of which would 
provide strong support for intellectual property rights, and some of 
which would not.195  This section adopts the traditional viewpoint 
that intellectual property can be justified by labor theory, but 
acknowledges that such a viewpoint may not be the strongest 
understanding of Locke’s treatises. 
Much like utilitarian theory, Locke’s labor theory recognizes 
the balancing act between the property rights of the creator and the 
rights of others.  The theory sets two provisos on ownership of 
 
 190 See generally Shiffrin, supra note 187 (interpreting Locke’s theory of private 
appropriation as not endorsing appropriation of most intellectual products).  
 191 See id. at 143.  
 192 See id. at 154. 
 193 See Fisher, supra note 159, at 184 (stating “whether Locke’s theory provides support 
for any intellectual property rights is uncertain”); see also Hughes, supra note 162, at 300 
(explaining that the Lockean explanation of intellectual property has immediate, intuitive 
appeal and has been accepted by many).  
 194 Fisher, supra note 159, at 182. 
 195 See id. at 183 (referring to six different rationales found in the Second Treaties, and 
pointing to certain of these rationales to make a stronger or weaker argument for 
intellectual property rights). 
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property: (1) one’s property (the fruit of his labor) must be 
included in the commons for others to improve upon unless 
removing it would leave “enough and as good” in common for 
others to use; and (2) property should not be wasted.196  These 
conditions suggest that intellectual property rights should not be so 
great as to interfere with the rights of others.  But Locke provided 
little guidance as to the proportionality of these rights, which 
leaves plenty of room for debate.197 
At first glance, it may seem as though droit de suite works 
under this theory—that artists deserve increased economic rights in 
their artwork because of the labor they put into developing their 
work and their reputation.  However, justifying droit de suite under 
labor theory would require a conflation of tangible property with 
intellectual property.  A painting or a sculpture is the fruit of the 
artist’s labor and therefore, she owns the physical art object as 
tangible property as well as the expression of the idea in the form 
of intellectual property—that is, as long as ownership of such 
things satisfies Locke’s two provisos.  However, the rights of 
others must limit the artist’s rights.  When the artist sells an art 
object to a buyer, that buyer compensates the artist by giving the 
artist the fruit of his labor.198  If the market has its way, this 
exchange is a trade for fair value.  So if the artist is able to 
continue to exert control over the art object, she is interfering with 
the buyer’s right to fully exploit the fruit of his own labor (which is 
now the art object by way of trade).  Even though the artist may 
retain control of the intellectual property in the art, she has yielded 
her right in the tangible object to the buyer through the original 
sale.  That is, the artist may deserve any increase in the pecuniary 
interests in the intellectual property in the art that results from the 
labor she put into developing her reputation, but that does not 
directly translate into a right to appropriate gains in the value of the 
physical property she has already sold for fair value. 
Furthermore, retaining a future interest in the art in the form of 
a resale royalty right would likely be wasteful, violating Locke’s 
 
 196 Shiffrin, supra note 187, at 146–47. 
 197 See Fisher, supra note 159, at 189. 
 198 Locke favored use of money in such exchanges because money reduces waste, 
thereby satisfying the second proviso. See Shiffrin, supra note 187, at 150. 
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second proviso.  As discussed above, applying the droit de suite 
creates great administrative burdens, and the benefits that artists 
receive are reduced when collective management agencies take 
their fee.199  Additionally, as a restraint on alienation, a droit de 
suite would reduce the likelihood that the physical property will be 
exploited in the most efficient manner.200  This translates into 
waste.201  Accordingly, under labor theory, the artist’s right to 
privately own his artwork hardly justifies attaching a resale royalty 
to the physical art object. 
The question, then, is whether control of the intellectual 
property in the art derived from the labor of creation entitles the 
artist to a resale royalty.  But the artist only sells the physical 
object to the buyer, and the physical object is all the buyer wishes 
to resell.  The artist does not deserve anything more because she 
has already extinguished her own rights in the physical property 
even though she has retained the intellectual property.  Of course, 
one might argue that the artist’s labor in creating additional quality 
work causes the value of her sold work to increase and therefore 
she has improved upon that work.  But she could not have actually 
improved the tangible object, as it has not been in her possession 
after the first sale, so she has merely improved her own reputation.  
The artwork is still wholly the physical property of the buyer—
instead, she owns the fruit of her labor in the form of the new work 
she will continue to create, which will be sold at higher prices.202  
She deserves nothing more. 
 
 199 See supra notes 85–93 and accompanying text. 
 200 See supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text. 
 201 This concept may seem fairly abstract when applied to art, as “exploiting art” 
essentially means looking at it, or even just owning it in the case of an art investor.  
However, if the art is not owned by the individual who values it most (and therefore is 
willing to pay the most for it), then it is not being exploited in the most efficient manner.  
The droit de suite acts as a transaction cost that could potentially prevent the most 
efficient result.  For a discussion of how transaction costs lead to waste, see generally 
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (establishing the Coase 
Theorem which holds that bargaining results in the most efficient outcome when 
transaction costs are absent). 
 202 See Gregory, supra note 56, at 188 (discussing the successful auction at Phillips de 
Pury of a piece by artist Jacob Kassay, who was then represented by Eleven Rivington, a 
lower east side New York art gallery: “Kassay did not directly benefit from his Phillips 
triumph, of course—only the seller and the auction house did.  But Eleven Rivington 
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In sum, the only theory of copyright that really comes close to 
supporting droit de is the personality theory, and even that theory 
has its shortcomings on the matter.  Granted, droit de suite could 
theoretically be justified as a non-intellectual property right, but 
since its inception early in the twentieth century, it has been 
intended to correct a perceived shortfall in copyright protection for 
visual artists.203  And outside the realm of intellectual property, 
droit de suite still acts as a restraint on alienation.  Without strong 
justification under any of these theories, droit de suite is 
incompatible with systems of law that justify their copyright 
regime under any of these theories.  Further, the right creates 
inconsistencies with little, if any, benefit for young artists.  
Coupled with the fact that droit de suite has failed to work as 
hoped in practice, it makes little sense to continue pushing for droit 
de suite laws in the international community. 
C. Alternatives to Droit de Suite 
Assuming the issues that droit de suite aims to correct actually 
require correction, implementing civil law style droit de suite is not 
the only option.  Artists can contractually obligate a buyer to pay a 
royalty upon resale—knowing full well that this decreases the 
initial sale price—and occasionally they do.204  This allows artists 
to decide if they want a resale royalty or not.  Critics might argue 
that artists are not in equal bargaining power with their buyers and 
so this is not a viable option, but artists have the backing of their 
dealers who have stronger bargaining power. 
Similarly, a droit de suite law that allows the right to be waived 
would give the artist the option of whether or not she wants to 
enjoy the right.  However, the same unequal bargaining argument 
applies here as with leaving resale royalties up to contractual 
negotiations.  But a waiveable and alienable droit de suite would fit 
more comfortably amongst the other rights of copyright holders in 
 
responded by raising his prices, and those prices remain high.  When things go as well as 
they have for Kassay, everyone winds up happy.”). 
 203 See supra notes 21–26 and accompanying text.  
 204 Boyd, supra note 102. 
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common law nations.205  This arrangement would make the right 
easier to justify under the utilitarian theory, as it could eliminate 
the problem of decreased primary market prices that theoretically 
results in less production of art by less established artists.  When 
droit de suite was originally imagined, it was made unwaiveable 
and inalienable because it was considered to be a moral right that 
derived from the personhood theory of copyright.  But considering 
the pecuniary benefits the right is designed to create, it makes more 
sense to treat droit de suite as an economic right like the right of 
reproduction and the right of performance or display.  Making the 
right waiveable and transferable would also mitigate the conflicts 
with property law and the free alienability of property, and 
therefore make it easier to justify under the labor theory of 
copyright. 
Another alternative to droit de suite would be increased 
display-based rights for artists.  In its report on droit de suite in 
1992, the U.S. Register of Copyrights suggested that broader 
display rights might be a better idea than a resale royalty right.206  
Currently, U.S. copyright law provides a right of display that is 
extinguished by the first sale doctrine.207  A modification of this 
law that grants special display rights to visual works of art could be 
crafted to require museums and galleries to pay the artists to show 
the work.  Such a right would be similar to the right of 
performance enjoyed by playwrights and musicians and would not 
put a restraint on alienation in the way that droit de suite does.  
Furthermore, this would fit more comfortably within an intellectual 
property regime because the display of an image is more closely 
related to the intellectual property in the image than to the physical 
art object.  It would not likely have the same detrimental effect on 
the price of art on the primary market as droit de suite opponents 
expect, so it seems more likely to promote progress through 
 
 205 See Merryman, supra note 3, at 123–24 (explaining how making the driot de suite 
unwaivable undercuts democratic law, by imposing legal protection even against the 
authors will).    
 206 See generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF. REG. OF COPYRIGHTS, DROIT DE SUITE: THE 
ARTIST’S RESALE ROYALTY (1992). 
 207 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(5), 109 (2006) (“[T]he owner of a particular copy . . . is entitled, 
without the authority of the copyright owner, to display that copy publicly . . . to viewers 
present at the place where the copy is located.”). 
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increased production of art.  However, this might be detrimental to 
the public through increased museum entrance costs and the 
negative side effects should be carefully analyzed before seriously 
considering such an option. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite strong evidence that droit de suite laws fail to provide 
most artists with greater economic security and may in fact be a 
burden for most artists, providing such a right to artists is 
becoming more common in global copyright regimes.  With full 
implementation throughout the European Union now in effect, the 
pressure for other nations to implement the right will continue to 
increase.  But droit de suite has never lived up to the expectations 
of lawmakers.  The right fails to benefit the individuals it means 
to—starving artists and their starving heirs—and instead benefits 
the few rich artists who dominate the secondary art market and the 
administrative agencies and bureaucracies that oversee the 
distribution of royalties.  Furthermore, droit de suite is an alien 
concept to Anglo-American common law, and it contradicts 
several well-established doctrines. 
All nations that do not already enforce a droit de suite should 
be wary of the political pressure to do so regardless of which 
theories of intellectual property they use to justify their copyright 
systems.  Droit de suite has an economic focus that is hardly a true 
concern of the personality theory; it fails to incentivize progress in 
art or benefit most artists monetarily as the utilitarian theory 
requires; and it provides a right beyond the confines of labor 
theory by interfering with the buyer’s right to control his property 
while failing to minimize waste by introducing inefficient 
transaction costs.  Though a droit de suite law surely has good 
intentions, it would likely do far more harm than good for both 
creators of cultural heritage and the public at large that benefits 
from the creative work. 
 
